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Chapter 8 - Leadership Accountability and Bargaining Failure in Norway: The Presthus Debacle

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2010

Wolfgang C. Müller
Affiliation:
Universität Wien, Austria
Kaare Strøm
Affiliation:
University of California, San Diego
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Summary

INTRODUCTION

Party politics can be spectacular popular entertainment. Regardless of whether they ultimately act out a tragedy or a comedy, party politicians occasionally grip the public's attention in powerful ways. Even the most prosaic of bills can at times set the stage for a parliamentary drama. Such was the case when the Norwegian parliament, the Storting, debated the government's farm bill in the hectic days of June 1987. I shall refer to these events as the Presthus debacle, in reference to Conservative leader Rolf Presthus, the man whose life was most severely affected by this dramatic fiasco of interparty bargaining.

This chapter analyzes the strange events that led to the Presthus debacle. These events are interesting for a number of reasons. First, the strategic moves that were made led to an outcome that none of the principal players preferred and few anticipated. Four parties explicitly committed to a change of government and collectively a legislative majority twice failed to oust a minority Labor government. The Presthus debacle shows that parties differ in the objectives they bring to coalition bargaining. In explaining such differences, we have to consider the constraints of within-party politics, and especially the consequences of different intraparty delegation regimes.

PRESTHUS AND THE EVENTS OF JUNE 1987

On Monday, June 8, 1987, Rolf Presthus was widely expected to become prime minister of Norway within a few short days.

Type
Chapter
Information
Policy, Office, or Votes?
How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions
, pp. 192 - 215
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1999

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