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V - 67B–69E

Moral virtue, genuine and spurious

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

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Summary

Summing up the preceding argument, and applying it to his own case, Socrates reaffirms his confidence in face of death: he is not so foolish as to complain at the approach of that for which his whole life has been a preparation. Many have died by their own hand that they might rejoin their loved ones who have passed away: will not the lover of wisdom be equally ready to pass to another world, that he may behold and enjoy that wisdom which he cannot fully attain in this world?

Socrates proceeds to contrast the philosopher with the ‘lover of the body’, and to show that the moral virtues as practised by the latter are spurious and self-contradictory. All true virtue involves intelligence (ϕρόνησις), which is declared to be a purge (καθαρμός) to rid the soul of the body's taint.

‘Well then, my friend’, said Socrates, ‘if that is true, I may well hope that when I have reached the place whither I am bound I shall attain in full measure, there at last, that for which I have spent the effort of a lifetime; wherefore it is with good hope that I set out upon the journey now appointed for me, as may any man who deems that his mind is made ready and purified.’

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Plato: Phaedo , pp. 52 - 57
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1972

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  • 67B–69E
  • Plato
  • Edited by R. Hackforth
  • Book: Plato: Phaedo
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511620287.007
Available formats
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  • 67B–69E
  • Plato
  • Edited by R. Hackforth
  • Book: Plato: Phaedo
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511620287.007
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • 67B–69E
  • Plato
  • Edited by R. Hackforth
  • Book: Plato: Phaedo
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511620287.007
Available formats
×