Plato has an implicit account which unifies anger, fear, appetite, and the other desires, pleasures, and emotions of the non-rational parts of the soul, and which marks them as fundamentally different from the desires, pleasures, and emotions of the rational part. It argues that Plato develops an implicit account of the passions, in the Timaeus and Philebus. The Philebus passage casually identifies passions with logoi and pictures interchangeably, as if there were no significant psychological difference between them. Dialogues that do distinguish parts of the soul attribute the Philebus' passions to the non-rational parts alone. The Philebus and the Timaeus give us strong evidence that Plato held a proto-Aristotelian account of some desires and emotions. They also indicate, if inconclusively, that he meant this account to extend to all the desires and emotions of the non-rational parts of the soul.