2 - The Metaethics of Worship
from Part I - Two Introductions
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 January 2025
Summary
A philosophical account of worship will answer at least two questions: the constitutive question of what worship is, and the normative question of what normative standards govern worship. The questions are related because what normative standards govern worship depends on whether worship consists primarily of some attitude or some action. This chapter briefly surveys the theoretical terrain of answers to these questions, with special attention to identifying the minimal conditions under which worship is fitting or supported by reasons.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Philosophy of WorshipDivine and Human Aspects, pp. 16 - 28Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2025
References
Achs, Rachel and Na’aman, Oded (2023). “The Subtleties of Fit: Reassessing the Fit-Value Biconditionals,” Philosophical Studies 180: 2523–2546. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098–023-01972-0CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bayne, Tim and Nagasawa, Yujin (2006). “The Grounds of Worship,” Religious Studies 42: 299–313.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Berker, Selim (2022). “The Deontic, the Evaluative, and the Fitting,” in Fittingness: Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity. Edited by Howard, Christopher and Roland, R. A. (Oxford University Press): 23–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
D’Arms, Justin and Jacobson, Daniel (2000a). “The Moralistic Fallacy: On the ‘Appropriateness’ of Emotions,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61: 65–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
D’Arms, Justin and Jacobson, Daniel (2000b). “Sentiment and Value,” Ethics 110: 722–748.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ewing, A. C. (1939). “A Suggested Non-Naturalistic Analysis of Good,” Mind 48: 1–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Howard, Christopher (2023). “Fitting Attitude Theories of Value,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2023 Edition). Edited by Zalta, Edward N. and Nodelman, Uri. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2023/entries/fitting-attitude-theoriesGoogle Scholar
Howard, Christopher and Roland, R. A. (2022). Fittingness: Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Feinberg, Joel (1965). “The Expressive Function of Punishment,” The Monist 49: 397–423.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Maguire, Barry (2018). “There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes,” Mind 127: 779–805.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McDowell, John (1987). “Projection and Truth in Ethics,” The Lindley Lecture, The University of Kansas.Google Scholar
McHugh, Connor and Way, Jonathan (2022). Getting Things Right: Fittingness, Reasons, and Value. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nietzsche, Friedrich (1967). On the Genealogy of Morals. Translated by Kaufmann, Walter and Hollingdale, R. J.. Random House.Google Scholar
Rabinowicz, Wlodek and Rönnow-Rasmussen, Toni (2004). “The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro-Attitudes and Value,” Ethics 114: 391–423.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rachels, James (1971). “God and Human Attitudes,” Religious Studies 7: 325–337.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rosen, Gideon (2015). “The Alethic Conception of Moral Responsibility,” in The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New Essays. Edited by Clarke, Randolph, McKenna, Michael, and Smith, Angela M. (Oxford University Press): 65–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smuts, Aaron (2012). “The Power to Make Others Worship,” Religious Studies 48: 221–237.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Swinburne, Richard (2016 [1993]). The Coherence of Theism. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tappolet, Christine (2011). “Values and Emotions: Neo-Sentimentalism’s Prospects,” in Morality and the Emotions. Edited by Bagnoli, Carla (Oxford University Press): 117–134.Google Scholar
Wettstein, Howard (2012). The Significance of Religious Experience. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wiggins, David (1987). “A Sensible Subjectivism?” in Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value (Clarendon Press): 185–214.Google Scholar