Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Prolegomenon: Husserl's turn to history and pure phenomenology
- I Plato's and Aristotle's theory of eidē
- II From descriptive psychology to transcendentally pure phenomenology
- III From the phenomenology of transcendental consciousness to that of monadological intersubjectivity
- 9 Phenomenological philosophy as transcendental idealism
- 10 The intersubjective foundation of transcendental idealism: the immanent transcendency of the world's objectivity
- IV From monadological intersubjectivity to the historical a priori constitutive of all meaning
- V The unwarranted historical presuppositions guiding the fundamental ontological and deconstructive criticisms of transcendental philosophy
- Epilogue: Transcendental-phenomenological criticism of the criticism of phenomenological cognition
- Coda: Phenomenological self-responsibility and the singularity of transcendental philosophy
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
10 - The intersubjective foundation of transcendental idealism: the immanent transcendency of the world's objectivity
from III - From the phenomenology of transcendental consciousness to that of monadological intersubjectivity
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Prolegomenon: Husserl's turn to history and pure phenomenology
- I Plato's and Aristotle's theory of eidē
- II From descriptive psychology to transcendentally pure phenomenology
- III From the phenomenology of transcendental consciousness to that of monadological intersubjectivity
- 9 Phenomenological philosophy as transcendental idealism
- 10 The intersubjective foundation of transcendental idealism: the immanent transcendency of the world's objectivity
- IV From monadological intersubjectivity to the historical a priori constitutive of all meaning
- V The unwarranted historical presuppositions guiding the fundamental ontological and deconstructive criticisms of transcendental philosophy
- Epilogue: Transcendental-phenomenological criticism of the criticism of phenomenological cognition
- Coda: Phenomenological self-responsibility and the singularity of transcendental philosophy
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Eidetic analysis of the self-constitution of transcendental Ego
In the second stage of Husserl's phenomenology, the distinction (as we have seen) between the empirical Ego and pure Ego is made. To the being of the former the “index of existence” that characterizes all the objects given in the natural attitude remains inseparable, while to the being of the latter this index has been annulled subsequent to the phenomenological reduction. The result of this reduction is the “merely intentional” being of the essentially empty pure Ego. In Husserl's third stage of phenomenology, the discovery of the pure Ego's concreteness complicates considerably the phenomenological status of the Ego. Husserl speaks, first of all, of the Ego as “himself existent for himself in continuous evidence; thus, in himself, he is continuously constituting himself as existing” (CM, 100). By the “Ego” here he evidently means the transcendental Ego, as his marginal note to this passage reads “Transcendental Self-Constitution”. He also speaks of “I, the reduced ‘human Ego’ (“psychophysical’ Ego)” (CM, 129), who is constituted, “accordingly, as a member of the “world’ with a multiplicity of “objects outside of me’”. And, again, he refers to “the transcendental Ego, who constitutes in his constitutive life everything that is ever objective for me – the Ego of all constitutions, who exists in his actual and potential life-processes and Ego-habitualities and who constitutes in them not only everything objective but also himself as identical Ego” (CM, 130).
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- The Philosophy of Husserl , pp. 156 - 173Publisher: Acumen PublishingPrint publication year: 2010