Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Notes on Contributors
- I Emotions, Thoughts and Feelings: What is a ‘Cognitive Theory’ of the Emotions and Does it Neglect Affectivity?
- II The Emotions and their Philosophy of Mind
- III Basic Emotions, Complex Emotions, Machiavellian Emotions
- IV Emotion, Psychosemantics, and Embodied Appraisals
- V Emotions and the Problem of Other Minds
- VI Emotional Feelings and Intentionalism
- VII Emotions, Rationality, and Mind/Body
- VIII The significance of recalcitrant emotion (or, anti-quasijudgmentalism)
- IX The Logic of Emotions
- X Emotion and Desire in Self-Deception
- XI Emotion, Weakness of Will, and the Normative Conception of Agency
- XII Narrative and Perspective; Values and Appropriate Emotions
- XIII Passion and Politics
- XIV Don't Worry, Feel Guilty
- Index
XII - Narrative and Perspective; Values and Appropriate Emotions
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 January 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Notes on Contributors
- I Emotions, Thoughts and Feelings: What is a ‘Cognitive Theory’ of the Emotions and Does it Neglect Affectivity?
- II The Emotions and their Philosophy of Mind
- III Basic Emotions, Complex Emotions, Machiavellian Emotions
- IV Emotion, Psychosemantics, and Embodied Appraisals
- V Emotions and the Problem of Other Minds
- VI Emotional Feelings and Intentionalism
- VII Emotions, Rationality, and Mind/Body
- VIII The significance of recalcitrant emotion (or, anti-quasijudgmentalism)
- IX The Logic of Emotions
- X Emotion and Desire in Self-Deception
- XI Emotion, Weakness of Will, and the Normative Conception of Agency
- XII Narrative and Perspective; Values and Appropriate Emotions
- XIII Passion and Politics
- XIV Don't Worry, Feel Guilty
- Index
Summary
To the realists.—You sober people who feel well armed against passion and fantasies and would like to turn your emptiness into a matter of pride and ornament: you call yourselves realists and hint that the world really is the way it appears to you. As if reality stood unveiled before you only, and you yourselves were perhaps the best part of it … But in your unveiled state are not even you still very passionate and dark creatures compared to fish, and still far too similar to an artist in love? And what is ‘reality’ for an artist in love? You are still burdened with those estimates of things that have their origin in the passions and loves of former centuries. Your sobriety still contains a secret and inextinguishable drunkenness. Your love of ‘reality’, for example—oh, that is a primeval ‘love’ … Subtract the phantasm and every human contribution from it, my sober friends! If you can! If you can forget your descent, your past, your training—all of your humanity and animality. (F. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Book Two, extract from Section 57)
We are reflective creatures, capable of thoughts about thoughts, feelings about feelings, and emotions about emotions. Of course, we can be unreflectively engaged in daily interaction with the world, and most of us often are. But our capacity for reflection gives rise to something of a need: a need to understand our lives though reflection on what has happened.
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- Philosophy and the Emotions , pp. 201 - 220Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2003
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