Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-g8jcs Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-23T16:00:20.878Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

10 - Geometric Objects and Perspectivalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 September 2022

James Read
Affiliation:
Pembroke College, Oxford
Nicholas J. Teh
Affiliation:
University of Notre Dame, Indiana
Get access

Summary

This chapter considers the metaphysics of geometric and non-geometric objects as they appear in physical theories such as general relativity, and the interactions between these considerations and the contemporary doctrines of perspectivalism and fragmentalism in the philosophy of science. Taking (following Quine) a kind’s being associated with a projectable predicate as a necessary condition for its being natural, there is a sense in which geometric objects can be assimilated to natural kinds but non-geometric objects cannot; this affords a rational reconstruction of philosophers’ and physicists’ suspicion of the latter (although this verdict can also be questioned). Even granting this, non-geometric objects can nevertheless represent real quantities in a perspectival sense-this is one way in which the perspectival realism doctrine can be endorsed. Moreover, recognising that non-geometric objects can represent real quantities in a perspectival sense affords support for fragmentalism: the view (at least in part) that frame-dependent effects are physically real. That said, one can argue that perspectivalism is superior to fragmentalism. In one sense, perspectivalism should be congenial to proponents of the ‘dynamical approach’ to spacetime theories-however, the pairing is imperfect. Endorsing perspectivalism/fragmentalism in this sense does not commit one to endorsing related-but arguably more opaque-‘structuralist’ views.

Type
Chapter
Information
The Philosophy and Physics of Noether's Theorems
A Centenary Volume
, pp. 257 - 273
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2022

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×