Book contents
- A Philosopher Looks at Friendship
- A Philosopher Looks at
- A Philosopher Looks at Friendship
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Prelude: Eighteen Aphorisms
- 1 Three Friendships – and Lots of Questions
- 2 Philosophers of Friendship: An Apology
- 3 Why I Don’t Start with a Formal Definition of Friendship
- 4 Examples of Friendship
- 5 Beginning the Natural History of Friendship
- 6 Deepening the Natural Historical Account
- 7 Being with Others
- 8 Lewis’s Four Loves – and Nygren’s Two
- 9 Aristotle’s Three Kinds of Philia – and Aristotle’s Will
- 10 Friendship, Love, and Second-Personality
- 11 Friendship as an Unemphatic Good
- 12 Bertrand Russell and His Over-Emphatic ‘German’ Friend
- 13 Sensitivity to Tacit Knowledge
- 14 Innocence
- 15 Moralism
- 16 Roles and Spontaneity
- 17 The Benefits of Friendship
- 18 Eighteen Quick Questions and Eighteen Quick Answers
- References
- Index
3 - Why I Don’t Start with a Formal Definition of Friendship
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 November 2024
- A Philosopher Looks at Friendship
- A Philosopher Looks at
- A Philosopher Looks at Friendship
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Prelude: Eighteen Aphorisms
- 1 Three Friendships – and Lots of Questions
- 2 Philosophers of Friendship: An Apology
- 3 Why I Don’t Start with a Formal Definition of Friendship
- 4 Examples of Friendship
- 5 Beginning the Natural History of Friendship
- 6 Deepening the Natural Historical Account
- 7 Being with Others
- 8 Lewis’s Four Loves – and Nygren’s Two
- 9 Aristotle’s Three Kinds of Philia – and Aristotle’s Will
- 10 Friendship, Love, and Second-Personality
- 11 Friendship as an Unemphatic Good
- 12 Bertrand Russell and His Over-Emphatic ‘German’ Friend
- 13 Sensitivity to Tacit Knowledge
- 14 Innocence
- 15 Moralism
- 16 Roles and Spontaneity
- 17 The Benefits of Friendship
- 18 Eighteen Quick Questions and Eighteen Quick Answers
- References
- Index
Summary
There is another important mistake that it is traditional for us philosophers to start our inquiries with, that I want to attack head on and straight away. This is an obvious falsehood that often blocks our inquiries altogether, namely the idea that you can’t get anywhere in philosophical inquiry unless you start with a formal, explicit, and watertight definition. No such definition is available in most of the cases that philosophy is interested in. And that includes our topic here, friendship. This is why I have got two chapters into the topic and counting, and I still haven’t offered any formal definition of friendship. I won’t be offering a definition any later, either – not even in the Q & A session in Chapter 18 – except in a loose and informal way.
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- A Philosopher Looks at Friendship , pp. 42 - 52Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024