Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 A theory of oil, revolution, and conflict
- 3 Evidence and research design
- 4 Quantitative impact of oil and revolution on conflict
- 5 Iraq
- 6 Libya and the Arab Jamahiriyya
- 7 Iran
- 8 Venezuela and the Bolivarian Revolution
- 9 Saudi Arabia
- 10 Does oil cause revolution?
- 11 Conclusion and policy implications
- References
- Index
9 - Saudi Arabia
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 February 2013
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 A theory of oil, revolution, and conflict
- 3 Evidence and research design
- 4 Quantitative impact of oil and revolution on conflict
- 5 Iraq
- 6 Libya and the Arab Jamahiriyya
- 7 Iran
- 8 Venezuela and the Bolivarian Revolution
- 9 Saudi Arabia
- 10 Does oil cause revolution?
- 11 Conclusion and policy implications
- References
- Index
Summary
We do not use oil for political purposes.
– Advisor to Crown Prince AbdullahThe Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the most important petrostate in the world. With an estimated 260 billion barrels in oil reserves, almost a quarter of the world’s total conventional supply, and the largest surplus production capacity, Saudi Arabia is the biggest player on the global oil market. In contrast to other countries studied in this book, Saudi Arabia was never revolutionary: it is a monarchy led by one of the oldest ruling dynasties in the world. This contrast makes it an excellent case to consider the political effects of oil in the absence of revolutionary government.
Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy is marked by two themes: the incentives for international cooperation generated by oil, and the checkbook diplomacy made possible by oil income. These themes highlight the fact that oil has multiple effects on the foreign policies of petrostates, and that the net impact is not always to increase the state’s propensity for aggression and conflict. Indeed, Saudi Arabia has largely avoided initiating direct interstate conflict. This is not to say that the Kingdom’s foreign policy is pacifist. It has used its ample financial resources to fund proxy wars and foreign insurgents. Yet the net effect of oil, in combination with a leadership that is generally risk-averse, has been to encourage Saudi Arabia to seek cooperation with powerful states and ensure that its oil exports continue to flow. This is most clearly seen in the US–Saudi relationship, which is a special focus of this chapter.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Petro-AggressionWhen Oil Causes War, pp. 225 - 249Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2013