Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Foreword
- PART I Perspectives in company law, SECTION 1: European company law: regulatory competition and free movement of companies
- PART 1 Perspectives in company law, SECTION 2: Corporate governance, shareholders' rights and auditing
- PART 1 Perspectives in company law, SECTION 3: Takeover law
- PART II Perspectives in financial regulation, SECTION 1: European perspectives
- PART 2 Perspectives in financial regulation, SECTION 2: Transatlantic perspectives
- 28 Learning from Eddy: a meditation upon organizational reform of financial supervision in Europe
- 29 The SEC embraces mutual recognition
- 30 Steps toward the Europeanization of US securities regulation, with thoughts on the evolution and design of a multinational securities regulator
- 31 The subprime crisis – does it ask for more regulation?
- 32 Juries and the political economy of legal origin
- PART III Miscellaneous
- Index
- References
31 - The subprime crisis – does it ask for more regulation?
from PART 2 - Perspectives in financial regulation, SECTION 2: Transatlantic perspectives
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 August 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Foreword
- PART I Perspectives in company law, SECTION 1: European company law: regulatory competition and free movement of companies
- PART 1 Perspectives in company law, SECTION 2: Corporate governance, shareholders' rights and auditing
- PART 1 Perspectives in company law, SECTION 3: Takeover law
- PART II Perspectives in financial regulation, SECTION 1: European perspectives
- PART 2 Perspectives in financial regulation, SECTION 2: Transatlantic perspectives
- 28 Learning from Eddy: a meditation upon organizational reform of financial supervision in Europe
- 29 The SEC embraces mutual recognition
- 30 Steps toward the Europeanization of US securities regulation, with thoughts on the evolution and design of a multinational securities regulator
- 31 The subprime crisis – does it ask for more regulation?
- 32 Juries and the political economy of legal origin
- PART III Miscellaneous
- Index
- References
Summary
Introduction
The creation and sale of asset-backed securities (ABS) is an established practice of financial management. It offers benefits to all participants. The original lender (originator) can sell the loans made to the original borrowers although they are correctly qualified as ‘imperfectly marketable assets’. In a normal sale the information asymmetry between the selling bank, who knows the borrower, and the acquiring institution, who does not know her that well, will result in a considerable discount from the nominal value of the loan. This outcome is avoided by the securitization procedure. The claims (assets) are collected in a pool, held by an independent and bankruptcy-remote ‘special purpose vehicle’ (SPV), which is often organized in the form of a trust. The SPV issues debt instruments – notes or commercial paper (CP) or bonds – to the public, mostly to institutional investors. Their information problems as to the credit or default risk affecting the pooled assets are greatly reduced by the analysis and the evaluation of the pool by a credit rating agency (CRA). In many transactions the rating is improved by the ‘credit enhancement’ (CE) provided by the arranger of the programme or by the arranger's bank; this is a guarantee that a set percentage of the losses generated by defaulting assets will be borne by the arranger or the bank.
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- Information
- Perspectives in Company Law and Financial Regulation , pp. 570 - 582Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2009