Professor Wymeersch's long and distinguished career, and his remarkable influence on EU securities regulation, is well-reflected in his Chairmanship of the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR). CESR can now be argued to be one of the (if not the) dominant influences on the recent and explosive development of EU securities regulation. This chapter seeks to assess the nature of CESR's activities at level 3 of the Lamfalussy process and, in particular, whether the burgeoning reach of its influence poses accountability and legitimacy risks or whether CESR has the potential to construct a discrete accountability model which supports its rapidly developing range of activities.

Introduction

It is a truisim to state that the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) period has wrought massive regulatory, institutional and supervisory change on EC securities markets. One of the main drivers for change has been the Lamfalussy process for delegated law-making. As is well known, under the Lamfalussy process, the Commission adopts ‘level 2’ rules, which are frequently, although not always, detailed and technical, based on mandates in the related ‘level 1’ measure (either a directive or a regulation) which is adopted under the Treaty-based inter-institutional procedures. The Commission is advised by the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR, composed of national regulators) and supervised by the European Securities Committee (ESC, composed of Member State representatives). Level 3 of the Lamfalussy process concerns convergence and consistency in the application of level 1 and 2 rules. Level 4 concerns enforcement.