Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Arguments against Substance Dualism, Part 1
- 3 Arguments against Substance Dualism, Part 2: Pairing Problems
- 4 Arguments for Substance Dualism
- 5 Interlude: What Exactly Is the Difference between Our Being Immaterial Souls and Our Being Composite Physical Objects?
- 6 Nonself, Part 1: Arguments against Our Existence
- 7 Nonself, Part 2: The Self Exists
- 8 Personal Ontology and Life after Death, Part 1: Resurrection, Reincarnation
- 9 Personal Ontology and Life after Death, Part 2: Mind Uploading
- References
- Index
5 - Interlude: What Exactly Is the Difference between Our Being Immaterial Souls and Our Being Composite Physical Objects?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 March 2024
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Arguments against Substance Dualism, Part 1
- 3 Arguments against Substance Dualism, Part 2: Pairing Problems
- 4 Arguments for Substance Dualism
- 5 Interlude: What Exactly Is the Difference between Our Being Immaterial Souls and Our Being Composite Physical Objects?
- 6 Nonself, Part 1: Arguments against Our Existence
- 7 Nonself, Part 2: The Self Exists
- 8 Personal Ontology and Life after Death, Part 1: Resurrection, Reincarnation
- 9 Personal Ontology and Life after Death, Part 2: Mind Uploading
- References
- Index
Summary
The previous three chapters identify numerous surprising similarities between substance dualism and the thesis that we are composite physical objects of some sort. This chapter reinforces this point, and argues that these two theses are more similar than is commonly recognized. While the chapter concedes that some substantive differences between the two theses remain, it is doubtful that these differences are of the right sort to allow us to decide between one thesis and the other.
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- Chapter
- Information
- Personal OntologyMystery and Its Consequences, pp. 102 - 107Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024