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9 - After Revolution

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 November 2014

Henry E. Hale
Affiliation:
George Washington University, Washington DC
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Summary

To say that revolutions and other leadership ousters are normal regime dynamics in patronal presidential systems is to say that they are not likely to constitute or lead to true or sustained democratization. That is, they do not tend to constitute regime change in the sense that they do not change the fundamental set of rules (formal or informal) that tend to govern which individuals have access to the most important state positions, how such access is obtained, and how binding state decisions are made. Once one side has won the political struggle and assumed the patronal presidency, even if the outcome at that moment was decided in a free and fair vote because of a rupture in the single-pyramid system, society’s most important patronal networks have great incentive once again to start rallying around the new president so as to preclude falling out of favor. This is because of the information and focal effects of presidentialist constitutions in patronal polities that were described in Chapter 4 and documented in many countries by Chapters 6 and 8. Postrevolutionary patronal presidents, having just won a major contest of patronal network strength, often also benefit politically from this fresh and obvious information confirming their dominance. But even when such a president is not yet dominant, as can happen when she is a first among equals in a revolutionary coalition, the fact that she occupies the patronal presidency tends to confirm that she is indeed the most powerful of the lot and gives her focal status for elites otherwise unsure where to place their bets.

Realizing this tendency, incoming revolutionary presidents thus have incentive to encourage it and use it to their advantage. They can do so actively (through repression or reward) or passively (through overlooking the corruption of political allies or selectively ignoring pleas for resource transfers made by political opponents). Taking advantage of the opportunities provided by the presidentialist constitution, however, does require skill, sensitivity, and patience in order to avoid authoritarian overreach. To the extent that the revolution does not produce a single new leader acknowledged by all, more skill and patience are required because other prominent individuals and networks must be marginalized without provoking them into a coordinated challenge. More skill and patience are also required the more complete is the discoordination of the country’s major networks at the outset.

Type
Chapter
Information
Patronal Politics
Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective
, pp. 307 - 371
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2014

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  • After Revolution
  • Henry E. Hale, George Washington University, Washington DC
  • Book: Patronal Politics
  • Online publication: 05 November 2014
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139683524.010
Available formats
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To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

  • After Revolution
  • Henry E. Hale, George Washington University, Washington DC
  • Book: Patronal Politics
  • Online publication: 05 November 2014
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139683524.010
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • After Revolution
  • Henry E. Hale, George Washington University, Washington DC
  • Book: Patronal Politics
  • Online publication: 05 November 2014
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139683524.010
Available formats
×