This book is a collection of essays with four main themes. The first is criticism of the theory known as ‘common law constitutionalism’, which holds either that Parliament is not sovereign because its authority is subordinate to fundamental common law principles such as ‘the Rule of Law’, or that its sovereignty is a creature of judge-made common law, which the judges have authority to modify or repudiate (Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 10). The second theme is analysis of how, and to what extent, Parliament may abdicate, limit or regulate the exercise of its own legislative authority, which includes the proposal of a novel theory of ‘manner and form’ requirements for law-making (Chapters 5, 6 and 7). This theory, which involves a major revision of Dicey's conception of sovereignty, and a repudiation of the doctrine of implied repeal, would enable Parliament to provide even stronger protection of human rights than is currently afforded by the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) (‘the HRA’), without contradicting either its sovereignty or the principle of majoritarian democracy (Chapters 7 and 8). The third theme is a detailed account of the relationship between parliamentary sovereignty and statutory interpretation, which strongly defends the reality of legislative intentions, and argues that sensible interpretation and parliamentary sovereignty both depend on judges taking them into account (Chapters 9 and 10).