Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- Part I The Formative Years
- Introduction
- 1 An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior
- 2 Effect of Market Organization on Competitive Equilibrium
- 3 Nature, the Experimental Laboratory, and the Credibility of Hypotheses
- 4 Experimental Auction Markets and the Walrasian Hypothesis
- 5 Experimental Studies of Discrimination versus Competition in Sealed-Bid Auction Markets
- 6 Experimental Economics: Induced Value Theory
- 7 Bidding and Auctioning Institutions: Experimental Results
- 8 Intertemporal Competitive Equilibrium: An Empirical Study of Speculation
- 9 Experimental Economics at Purdue
- Part II Institutions and Market Performance
- Part III Public Goods
- Part IV Auctions and Institutional Design
- PART V Industrial Organization
- Part VI Perspectives on Economics
2 - Effect of Market Organization on Competitive Equilibrium
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 July 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- Part I The Formative Years
- Introduction
- 1 An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior
- 2 Effect of Market Organization on Competitive Equilibrium
- 3 Nature, the Experimental Laboratory, and the Credibility of Hypotheses
- 4 Experimental Auction Markets and the Walrasian Hypothesis
- 5 Experimental Studies of Discrimination versus Competition in Sealed-Bid Auction Markets
- 6 Experimental Economics: Induced Value Theory
- 7 Bidding and Auctioning Institutions: Experimental Results
- 8 Intertemporal Competitive Equilibrium: An Empirical Study of Speculation
- 9 Experimental Economics at Purdue
- Part II Institutions and Market Performance
- Part III Public Goods
- Part IV Auctions and Institutional Design
- PART V Industrial Organization
- Part VI Perspectives on Economics
Summary
INTRODUCTION
Since the use of laboratory experimental techniques in the testing of economic hypotheses seems to have become reasonably well established in recent years, this paper will not attempt to provide any general methodological justification for its existence. A previous study presented the results of ten exploratory pilot experiments in competitive (multitrader auction) market behavior. The major methodological purposes of that study were to (i) test the feasibility of experimental techniques, (ii) synthesize one or more standard experimental designs, and (iii) provide the foundation for a more rigorous empirical examination of several specific hypotheses. The conclusions suggested in that paper were based in part upon hypotheses whose tests and theoretical rationalization were developed after the experimental data had been obtained. The results of such a posteriori testing and theorizing based largely upon unreplicated experiments should be considered highly tentative until such results have been confirmed by fur her experiments designed specifically to test the particular hypotheses in question.
This paper will report on the results of a series of experiments designed exclusively for the purpose of testing various hypotheses concerning the price equilibrium and adjustment behavior of markets whose organization permits either sellers or buyers, but not both, to engage actively in the higgling and bargaining process.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Papers in Experimental Economics , pp. 35 - 55Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1991