By the spring of 1981, the Palestinian nationalist movement found itself in a complex situation of contrasting strengths and weaknesses. The Camp David accords, with their provisions for self-rule in the occupied territories, had dealt the PLO a harsh diplomatic setback. But the unanimity of the opposition expressed to those provisions by the Palestinians of the occupied territories had stalled their implementation and brought valuable new bases of support from inside the occupied areas into the PLO's constituency. The Arab League's score of member-states found themselves weak and divided as never before. This practically ruled out the chances of arriving at any negotiated settlement with Israel which might satisfy the PLO's already reduced aspirations. But it did leave the PLO/Fateh leaders some room for that inter-Arab manoeuvring which had traditionally been their key to survival; while the very fragility with which many Arab regimes maintained their hold on power gave the PLO/Fateh leaders, with their near-unanimous base of Palestinian support, a relatively stronger position in their bilateral dealings with these regimes. Militarily, meanwhile, the situation in Lebanon had turned into a treacherous stalemate: the Israelis launched repeated and damaging air, land and sea raids against the PLO/ Joint Forces1 positions throughout 1981, but were ultimately unable – short of mounting a really major offensive – to dent them significantly.

By April 1981, there was already a strong expectation that just such an offensive was imminent, and by early June that year, a French reporter was writing from Beirut about expectations of ‘an Israeli-Phalangist plan which Yasser Arafat calls the “accordion” plan: its aim is to catch the Palestinian forces in a pincer movement between the Christian militia in Beirut and the Israeli army in South Lebanon'.