Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Contributors
- Foreword
- Europe endless – Kraftwerk
- Introduction
- 1 Lessons from the Past? The 1954 Association Agreement between the UK and the European Coal and Steel Community
- 2 From the European Free Trade Association to the European Economic Community and the European Economic Area: Portugal’s Post-Second World War Path
- 3 Norway and the European Economic Area: Why the Most Comprehensive Trade Agreement Ever Negotiated Is Not Good Enough
- 4 Switzerland: Striking Hard Bargains with Soft Edges
- 5 The Customs Union between Turkey and the European Union
- 6 Ukraine: The Association Agreement Model
- 7 Canada and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
- 8 The World Trade Organization Model
- 9 “Singapore on the Thames”
- 10 The United Kingdom and the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership
- 11 Australia (and New Zealand) after the 1973 “Great Betrayal”
- 12 What Future for the Crown Dependencies, Overseas Territories and Gibraltar?
- 13 The Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland: A Flexible and Imaginative Solution for the Unique Circumstances on the Island of Ireland?
- 14 EU–UK Security Relations after Brexit
- 15 The UK Still In Europe? Is the UK’s Membership of the Council of Europe In Doubt?
- Afterword
- Index
13 - The Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland: A Flexible and Imaginative Solution for the Unique Circumstances on the Island of Ireland?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 December 2023
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Contributors
- Foreword
- Europe endless – Kraftwerk
- Introduction
- 1 Lessons from the Past? The 1954 Association Agreement between the UK and the European Coal and Steel Community
- 2 From the European Free Trade Association to the European Economic Community and the European Economic Area: Portugal’s Post-Second World War Path
- 3 Norway and the European Economic Area: Why the Most Comprehensive Trade Agreement Ever Negotiated Is Not Good Enough
- 4 Switzerland: Striking Hard Bargains with Soft Edges
- 5 The Customs Union between Turkey and the European Union
- 6 Ukraine: The Association Agreement Model
- 7 Canada and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
- 8 The World Trade Organization Model
- 9 “Singapore on the Thames”
- 10 The United Kingdom and the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership
- 11 Australia (and New Zealand) after the 1973 “Great Betrayal”
- 12 What Future for the Crown Dependencies, Overseas Territories and Gibraltar?
- 13 The Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland: A Flexible and Imaginative Solution for the Unique Circumstances on the Island of Ireland?
- 14 EU–UK Security Relations after Brexit
- 15 The UK Still In Europe? Is the UK’s Membership of the Council of Europe In Doubt?
- Afterword
- Index
Summary
Negotiating its withdrawal from the European Union was a painful, protracted process for the United Kingdom. It was also a process that saw it concede ground to the EU on most withdrawal issues. Unsurprisingly, the EU was often presented in much of the UK media and particularly by supporters of Brexit as inflexible and short-sighted. There were accusations that it was not only refusing to show any appreciation of the UK position, but also intent on “punishing” the UK into leaving. Such accusations overlook the fact that, on the question of Northern Ireland, at least, the EU adopted a position of relative flexibility. Conscious of the challenges that Brexit posed for the island of Ireland, the EU and the UK agreed a dedicated Protocol providing for a set of arrangements unique in the EU's external relations. While the EU is quick to point to the flexibility it has shown in agreeing special terms for Northern Ireland, these are not without their problems for the UK and the EU.
That the Withdrawal Agreement contains a dedicated Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland is due to a range of challenges that UK withdrawal from the EU poses for Northern Ireland and the island of Ireland more generally and, importantly, the EU's and the UK's willingness to respond to these challenges. The willingness was evident as soon as then Prime Minister Theresa May, on 29 March 2017, submitted her letter to Donald Tusk, president of the European Council, notifying the EU of the UK's intention to withdraw, and in so doing setting in motion the Article 50 withdrawal process. That notification recognized the need to pay attention to the UK's “unique relationship” with Ireland and “the importance of the peace process in Northern Ireland”. Hence, a “return to a hard border” on the island of Ireland should be avoided and the Common Travel Area (CTA) between the UK and Ireland maintained. Moreover, the UK had “an important responsibility to make sure nothing is done to jeopardize the peace process in Northern Ireland, and to continue to uphold the [1998] Belfast [‘Good Friday’] Agreement”.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Outside the EUOptions for Britain, pp. 163 - 176Publisher: Agenda PublishingPrint publication year: 2020