Some would protest that they do not know what I mean by “more or less momentary person-stages, or time-slices of continuant persons, or persons-at-times.” … [This] objection is easy to answer, especially in the case where the stages are less momentary rather than more. Let me consider that case only, though I think that instantaneous stages also are unprob-lematic; I do not really need them. A person-stage is a physical object, just as a person is. (If persons had a ghostly part as well, so would person-stages.) It does many of the same things that a person does: it talks and walks and thinks, it has beliefs and desires, it has a size and shape and location. It even has a temporal duration. But only a brief one, for it does not last long. (We can pass over the question how long it can last before it is a segment rather than a stage, for that question raises no objection of principle.) It begins to exist abruptly, and it abruptly ceases to exist soon after. […]