Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Chapter 1 Introducing Substance Concepts
- Chapter 2 Substances: The Ontology
- Chapter 3 Classifying, Identifying, and the Function of Substance Concepts
- Chapter 4 The Nature of Abilities: How Is Extension Determined?
- Chapter 5 More Mama, More Milk and More Mouse: The Structure and Development of Substance Concepts
- Chapter 6 Substance Concepts Through Language: Knowing the Meanings of Words
- Chapter 7 How We Make Our Ideas Clear: Epistemology for Empirical Concepts
- Chapter 8 Content and Vehicle in Perception
- Chapter 9 Sames Versus Sameness in Conceptual Contents and Vehicles
- Chapter 10 Grasping Sameness
- Chapter 11 In Search of Strawsonian Modes of Presentation
- Chapter 12 Rejecting Identity Judgments and Fregean Modes
- Chapter 13 Knowing What I'm Thinking Of
- Chapter 14 How Extensions of New Substance Concepts are Fixed: How Substance Concepts Acquire Intentionality
- Chapter 15 Cognitive Luck: Substance Concepts in an Evolutionary Frame
- Appendix A Contrast with Evans on Information-Based Thoughts
- Appendix B What Has Natural Information to Do with Intentional Representation?
- References
- Index
Chapter 10 - Grasping Sameness
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 December 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Chapter 1 Introducing Substance Concepts
- Chapter 2 Substances: The Ontology
- Chapter 3 Classifying, Identifying, and the Function of Substance Concepts
- Chapter 4 The Nature of Abilities: How Is Extension Determined?
- Chapter 5 More Mama, More Milk and More Mouse: The Structure and Development of Substance Concepts
- Chapter 6 Substance Concepts Through Language: Knowing the Meanings of Words
- Chapter 7 How We Make Our Ideas Clear: Epistemology for Empirical Concepts
- Chapter 8 Content and Vehicle in Perception
- Chapter 9 Sames Versus Sameness in Conceptual Contents and Vehicles
- Chapter 10 Grasping Sameness
- Chapter 11 In Search of Strawsonian Modes of Presentation
- Chapter 12 Rejecting Identity Judgments and Fregean Modes
- Chapter 13 Knowing What I'm Thinking Of
- Chapter 14 How Extensions of New Substance Concepts are Fixed: How Substance Concepts Acquire Intentionality
- Chapter 15 Cognitive Luck: Substance Concepts in an Evolutionary Frame
- Appendix A Contrast with Evans on Information-Based Thoughts
- Appendix B What Has Natural Information to Do with Intentional Representation?
- References
- Index
Summary
INTRODUCTION: IMAGES OF IDENTITY
In Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar, Strawson (1974) offers “a picture or model” of what happens when a man learns that two things formerly thought to be separate are in fact one and the same. “We are to picture a [knowledge] map, as it were” on which all those individuals the man knows of are represented by dots, and the predicates the man knows to apply to each are written in lines emanating from these dots or, if the predicate is relational, lines joining two dots.
Now when [the man] receives what is for him new information … he incorporates [this] by … making an alteration on his knowledge map [for example,] he draws a further line between two dots. But when it is an identity statement containing two names from which he receives new information, he adds no further lines. He has at least enough lines already; at least enough lines and certainly one too many dots. So what he does is to eliminate one dot of the two, at the same time transferring to the remaining one … all those lines and names which attach to the eliminated dot. (Strawson 1974, pp. 54–5.)
On Strawson's picture, the identity of a particular is represented in the mind by the identity of another particular. So long as you haven't made any mistakes, everything you know about your mother is attached to the same particular mental representation of your mother, to the same token.
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- On Clear and Confused IdeasAn Essay about Substance Concepts, pp. 136 - 146Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2000