Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Tables
- Figures
- Maps
- 1 Rethinking the Resource Curse
- 2 Why Fiscal Regimes
- 3 State Ownership with Control versus Private Domestic Ownership
- 4 Two Versions of Rentierism
- 5 Petroleum Rents without Rentierism
- 6 State Ownership without Control versus Private Foreign Ownership
- 7 Eluding the Obsolescing Bargain
- 8 Revisiting the Obsolescing Bargain
- 9 Taking Domestic Politics Seriously
- 10 The Myth of the Resource Curse
- Appendix A List of Authors’ Interviews
- Appendix B Variation in Ownership Structure in Developing Countries
- Appendix C Responses to Select Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) Questions by Age Group
- Appendix D Ranking Basis for Determining which Countries are Included in Our Database
- Works Cited
- Index
Figures
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Tables
- Figures
- Maps
- 1 Rethinking the Resource Curse
- 2 Why Fiscal Regimes
- 3 State Ownership with Control versus Private Domestic Ownership
- 4 Two Versions of Rentierism
- 5 Petroleum Rents without Rentierism
- 6 State Ownership without Control versus Private Foreign Ownership
- 7 Eluding the Obsolescing Bargain
- 8 Revisiting the Obsolescing Bargain
- 9 Taking Domestic Politics Seriously
- 10 The Myth of the Resource Curse
- Appendix A List of Authors’ Interviews
- Appendix B Variation in Ownership Structure in Developing Countries
- Appendix C Responses to Select Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) Questions by Age Group
- Appendix D Ranking Basis for Determining which Countries are Included in Our Database
- Works Cited
- Index
Summary
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Oil Is Not a CurseOwnership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States, pp. xiiPublisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2010