Naturalisms

For many philosophers and scientists, the word “naturalism” conjures up a metaphysical and a methodological thesis. Both concern objects that are out there in “nature,” meaning things that exist in space and time. The contrast is with supernatural entities; if such things exist, they exist outside of space and time:

I put an “s” subscript on the second naturalism to mark the fact that it gives advice about doing science. These two naturalisms are the ones that get cited in discussions of the conflict between evolutionary theory and creationism. Evolutionary biologists often say that their theory obeys the requirements of methodological naturalism but is silent on the metaphysical question. They further contend that creationism rejects both these naturalisms; here they are helped by creationists themselves, who often express their belief in a supernatural deity and argue that methodological naturalisms is a shackle from which science needs to break free. Although it is worth inquiring further into this interpretation of evolutionary theory and creationism, I won't do so here. Rather, I am interested in a third naturalism. Like the second, it is methodological, but it is aimed at the practice of philosophy, not of science (hence the “p” subscript that I use to label it):

There are trivial similarities linking science and philosophy that lend a superficial plausibility to this naturalistic thesis.