Objections to nuclear deterrence have been around almost as long as the Bomb itself. Broadly, and too crudely, they take two forms. On the one hand the policy (or mix of policies) is criticized in terms of its pragmatic framework – it is too costly, it is too dangerous, it doesn't deter enough (witness Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Vietnam, Afghanistan, etc.), its empirical assumptions (e.g. about the degree of the enemy's malevolence) are false. On the other hand the policy is rejected on the ground that the particular kind of threatening attitude it embodies violates deep moral constraints on how anyone should act or set himself to act. These constraints operate even, indeed especially, when the agent has good ends in view, and this is worth remembering since defenders of deterrence are naturally quick to stress the good they hope to achieve. It should also be noted that both lines of criticism usually involve moral concerns, since those who, for instance, object to the cost or risk of deterrence are not merely concerned for their own pockets or hides. More generally, some concern for avoiding harmful consequences and seeking beneficial ones clearly has a place in morality, though it must be insisted that it is not the whole of it.

I have spoken of constraints, and it is natural to do so since the area of morality I have in mind often comes into play by way of restricting our choice of programs, techniques, or means to achieving what we see as worthwhile objectives.