Introduction

The hinge propositions discussed by Moore and Wittgenstein have loomed large in some of the most illuminating strands of analytic epistemology. For three good reasons. First, hinge propositions promise an indirect response to sceptical challenges, either because they mark limits of meaningful doubt – as suggested by Wittgenstein – or because they mark limits of reasonable doubt – as suggested by Moore's method of differential certainty. Secondly, they draw attention to the way we actually make and assess knowledge claims and form our beliefs. Thirdly, in both these capacities they shed light not just on the concept of knowledge, but also on concepts like belief, certainty, doubt, meaning and rationality.

My paper divides into three parts. The first one (Sections 2–6) covers the role of hinges in our belief-system and the conceptual connections just mentioned. It introduces the idea of epistemic hinges in the context of considering various ways in which propositions or beliefs might be basic or fundamental. Its main contention is that the foundational role Wittgenstein assigns to hinge propositions differs from being basic in the sense of being genetically prior, psychologically entrenched, logically simple, semantically constitutive, or conceptually simple; it is epistemic, while also differing from the kind of basic status postulated by traditional foundationalism. The second part (Sections 7 and 8) turns to the potential of hinge propositions for overcoming scepticism. It starts out with Wittgenstein's line, according to which scepticism undermines the very framework within which doubt makes sense. It ends by recommending another response to scepticism, which combines Moore's method of differential certainty with Wittgenstein's insights concerning hinge propositions. Moore was right to hold that it is more rational to reject the premises of sceptical arguments than the knowledge claims they try to impugn. At the same time, On Certainty provides the rationale for Moore's position, namely that doubt about these knowledge claims would undermine the very framework of our thought, speech and action.

Having dealt with the three interrelated areas in epistemology mentioned above, the final part (Sections 9–10) takes a furtive glance at two recent debates in which the idea of hinge propositions has not featured so far. First I consider implications for the currently raging dispute over peer disagreement.