Book contents
- The Non-coherence Theory of Digital Human Rights
- The Non-coherence Theory of Digital Human Rights
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- Part I The Contextual Challenges and Purpose of the Non-coherence Theory of Digital Human Rights
- Part II Reflections on Some Theories and Doctrines
- 6 The Doctrine of the Sameness of Rights Online and Offline
- 7 Claims of New Internet-Specific Human Rights
- 8 The Capabilities Approach
- 9 The Frankfurt School and the Normative Order of the Internet
- 10 The Articulation and Critical Review of Self-Normativity
- 11 The Transversality Principle (Teubner)
- 12 Network Society Approach (Castells)
- Part III The Core Elements of Non-coherence Theory
- Part IV The Impact of the Non-coherence Theory
- Part V Internet Balancing Formula
- In Lieu of the Concluding Remarks
- Index
11 - The Transversality Principle (Teubner)
from Part II - Reflections on Some Theories and Doctrines
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 February 2024
- The Non-coherence Theory of Digital Human Rights
- The Non-coherence Theory of Digital Human Rights
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- Part I The Contextual Challenges and Purpose of the Non-coherence Theory of Digital Human Rights
- Part II Reflections on Some Theories and Doctrines
- 6 The Doctrine of the Sameness of Rights Online and Offline
- 7 Claims of New Internet-Specific Human Rights
- 8 The Capabilities Approach
- 9 The Frankfurt School and the Normative Order of the Internet
- 10 The Articulation and Critical Review of Self-Normativity
- 11 The Transversality Principle (Teubner)
- 12 Network Society Approach (Castells)
- Part III The Core Elements of Non-coherence Theory
- Part IV The Impact of the Non-coherence Theory
- Part V Internet Balancing Formula
- In Lieu of the Concluding Remarks
- Index
Summary
The transversality effect for mutually incompatible social theories is that of non-exclusivity. Competing theories continue to exist and the elements of choice between theories are determined by practice, convenience and economies, and not necessarily by idealistic goals. Because Teubner does not propose any specific quality standards or quality control elements for a theory to qualify within a circle of competing theories, transversality can become, superficially, an instrument for human rights conceptualisation, whereby the quest for idealistic and practice-independent justification is lost. On further inspection, we can construe an argument that the loss of the quest towards idealism depends on how we understand the term idealism. Giving up the grand idea of human rights superiority, and accepting multiple readings of what human rights mean, leads to the extreme principle of anything goes within the meaning of Paul Feyerabend’s epistemological anarchism.
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- The Non-Coherence Theory of Digital Human Rights , pp. 121 - 124Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024