Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Context and Causes
- 2 Authoritarian Legacies and Regime Change
- 3 Egypt’s Modern Revolutions and the Fall of Mubarak
- 4 A Depressive Pre–Arab Uprisings Economic Performance
- 5 Bread and Olive Oil
- Part II Thematic and Comparative Aspects
- Part III Countries in Turmoil
- Part IV Regional and International Implications
- Selected Bibliography
- Index
- References
4 - A Depressive Pre–Arab Uprisings Economic Performance
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2014
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Context and Causes
- 2 Authoritarian Legacies and Regime Change
- 3 Egypt’s Modern Revolutions and the Fall of Mubarak
- 4 A Depressive Pre–Arab Uprisings Economic Performance
- 5 Bread and Olive Oil
- Part II Thematic and Comparative Aspects
- Part III Countries in Turmoil
- Part IV Regional and International Implications
- Selected Bibliography
- Index
- References
Summary
This chapter examines the economic vulnerabilities behind the Arab uprisings. The analysis shows that per capita income in the Arab world has stagnated since the early 1980s. The core reasons for this retrogression are successive Arab military defeats, compradorial ruling elites and an imperialist oil grab. Arab states lost autonomy over policy which instead became dictated by the demands of global capital. Economic growth became more heavily dependent on oil rather than on productive investment while conflict and a failure of the state have caused a failure of development and hindered long-term investment. The business cycle in the Arab world is mainly driven by exogenous pressures and represents a case of an ‘imperialistically determined cycle’. Development will continue to fail unless post-uprising governments adopt radical measures that deliver redistribution and land reform.
This essay investigates the determinants of the business cycle in the Arab world (AW) prior to the Arab popular uprisings. As is the case after a military rout, several defeats against Israel and the United States stripped Arab countries of sovereignty and autonomy over policy and subjected the working population to the terms of surrender dictated by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (WB-IMF) policy at the behest of global capital. The social products and assets of the Arab world, including no less the human component, were taken in a manner reminiscent of colonial patterns of capital accumulation. In particular, pursuant to the Camp David accords, which splintered the Arab world, the pattern of economic growth has come to depend more heavily on oil and geopolitical rents, as opposed to the systemic component associated with productive investment. The inverse relationship between political instability and developmental growth became more pronounced with the progress of time. Uncertainty over the time horizon associated with conflict and potential state collapse hampered long-term investment and capital accumulation. This essay contends that the business cycle in the AW is determined by a quasi-colonial relationship underpinned by oil control, and propelled almost in its entirety by political considerations relating to imperialist hegemony.
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- The New Middle EastProtest and Revolution in the Arab World, pp. 80 - 106Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2013
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