Part II assesses the new economic governance of the Eurozone in light of the “rule of law” framework. Chapter 3 appraises this framework in light of the principle of conferral and the competence allocation system set up by the Treaties. It finds that the Treaties are marked by deep conceptual ambiguity as to the reach of the notion of economic policy and as to the meaning of the concept of policy coordination. It shows how this ambiguity, in-built flexibility and dynamism was fully taken advantage of by the Union in the context of the Eurocrisis and COVID-19 crisis to substantially transform and upgrade EU economic governance. It finds that the reform process flirted with the limits of what was constitutionally feasible but never facially violated the scope of the Treaties’ enabling clauses for economic policy. The advent of a new system of EU economic governance in the postcrisis era is not irreconcilable with the competence allocation system of the Union but materializes the Treaties’ spirit of purposive openness and contextual adaptability. As the EU legislator seems to have reached, with NGEU, the outer edge of what is constitutionally feasible, any further consolidation of the economic pillar would require Treaty revision.