Introduction

The previous chapter sought to investigate whether mainstream International Relations (IR) theories provide a sufficient tool with which to appreciate a rare phenomenon in world politics and history, that is, the coexistence of competition and cooperation (coupled with restraint) between two rival great powers. It concluded that while they offer important insights, they do not specifically focus on what was defined as ‘coopetition’. Therefore, a theoretical perspective for best appreciating current US– China coopetition, which draws on the structural contradiction of the liberal order, was put forward. A review of the literature of US– China relations and of the debate on the New Cold War was carried out; it was shown that a new type of cold war exists between the US and China, one that manifests features not just of the Cold War – from which it differs greatly – but also of cold wars.

Considering this, Chapter 3 will zoom in on the conceptual and historical fundamentals of US– China relations. This is necessary to equip the reader with more precise tools to understand the contradictory coexistence of cooperation and competition, and of economic and security interests, as was shown in the previous chapter. While the liberal international order (LIO) provides the context to these contradictions, this chapter shows that US and Chinese grand strategies, over many decades, have come to embody such a tension, as they sought in very different ways to rise and master international relations in a world order deeply impacted by capitalism. Consequently, this tension has emerged in the contemporary history of US– China diplomatic relations, that is, since 1972 until today, when Washington and Beijing were capable of making major steps forward from both an economic and diplomatic perspective while important differences, for instance on political systems and on Taiwan, remained.

The rest of the chapter is organized in the following manner: the first section analyses the making of US grand strategy from a historical perspective. It argues that US grand strategy had a gestation period which lasted from the early 19th century to the end of the Second World War, during which the power projection of the US expanded as its interests overseas grew.