Introduction

The previous chapter explored the economic relationship between the US and China. It was argued that this is an important driver for restraint that keeps the competition between Washington and Beijing ‘cold’. However, it was also noted that this is a cause of frictions between the two great powers, and that throughout the 2010s both countries took steps for preparing to decouple – to a degree. It was suggested that because interdependence has become a cause of concern in both Washington and Beijing, decoupling might represent a healthy development for the relationship. Yet, this does not necessarily mean that different kinds of frictions could not arise from a decreased level of interaction.

This chapter will take a similar approach to the previous one, regarding how these fit into the rest of the book. The focus will also be on the 2010s and the very early 2020s. The role of this chapter in the wider book is to zoom in on the most competitive if not conflictual dynamics of the relationship between the US and China, while emphasizing that even within this sphere there are limits to confrontation. This chapter will argue that US– China relations in the 2010s – and this still continues to apply today – were progressively militarily conflictual within the First Island Chain; yet, when moving away from this confined region, military tensions declined. This is because China lacks the necessary strategic depth to challenge US power, in addition to an interest for taking international leadership responsibilities. To an extent, throughout the 2010s the US was also seeking to deter China in a cautious manner, especially during the Obama years, or was facing the challenge of dealing with allies that were not convinced about the idea of containing China militarily – as was the case with India's membership in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). At the same time, while the possibility of war between the US and China was always remote if one considers the geography of the whole world, it is true that the stakes within the First Island Chain were high. This condition has not changed in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine and, if anything, it might have worsened.