The debate on the German inter-war economy has not yet been completed but enough work has been done to fill in the important answers. More research is needed on the relationship between industry and government in the 1930s, and on questions to do with profitability and productivity. But on many aspects of the period it is possible to reach more definite conclusions.

The problems of economic growth during the inter-war years were nowhere so acute as in Germany. The structural problems of the world economy in the 1920s were exaggerated in their effect upon Germany because of the results of the war and inflation. These problems had already led to a downturn of business activity before the world slump occurred. The subsequent depression was then intensified by the fall in foreign lending and by government deflationary policies which were pursued partly because the unorthodox alternatives were unacceptable, but largely because of internal and external political constraints. It was the combination of such constraints and the structural problems of the economy that forced the business cycle downwards to the point where many Germans were prepared to accept more radical alternatives, both Communist and National Socialist.

The triumph of the Nazi alternative in 1933 led to the introduction of a wide range of government policies designed to augment and speed up the existing recovery. Particular emphasis was put on investment-led growth and on public expenditure and fiscal concessions designed to expand demand.