In June 1912, the Reichstag passed the third Amendment to the Navy Law of 1900 (Novelle) within six years. Eventually, at least it seemed, Tirpitz had achieved his main aim: building up a powerful fleet which would be more than a ‘risk’ for the Royal Navy. The strength of the German navy, at least on paper, was indeed amazing. In the future, 61 capital ships, 40 small cruisers, 144 torpedo boats and 72 submarines would be able to defend the nation's ‘sea-interests’ – as Tirpitz had always put it since the mid-1890s – even against the world's supreme sea power, Great Britain. Moreover, when the Reichstag finally passed this Amendment with a great majority, every observer could have the feeling that the nation had realised that the expansion of its sea power was inevitable in an era of imperial rivalry. From a strictly naval point of view, Tirpitz had also achieved his most important aim, namely building up a fleet which renewed itself automatically within 20 years at an annual rate of three large ships.

This triumph had, however, been very difficult to achieve. Occasionally, in the years before, it had seemed more likely that Tirpitz would fail instead of achieving a further success. Though the Amendment (Novelle) of 1908 had been passed in the Reichstag without any difficulties, the navy's future had soon looked dark for various reasons. Most importantly, the British government made clear in mid-1908 that it was willing and prepared to take up the gauntlet which Tirpitz had thrown down in 1906/7. Unless the Germans both slowed down the tempo of naval building and stopped enlarging their navy, a naval arms race would follow.

Though the Emperor stood firm and bluntly rejected any concessions in his talks with Sir Charles Hardinge during the visit of Edward VII at Cronberg in August 1908, the Chancellor, Prince Bülow, increasingly questioned the course that the German government had embarked upon. Unlike both the Emperor and Tirpitz, Bülow had realised that the situation had begun to change fundamentally. Whereas Germany's leadership had hoped to pursue a free-hand policy between the other great powers at the turn of the century, the country had been isolated in Europe since the signing of the Anglo-Russian entente in 1907.