Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Notes on German Sources
- Introduction
- 1 Tirpitz's Ascendency: The Design and Initial Execution of a Naval Challenge 1895–1904/5
- 2 Recognising the German Challenge: The Royal Navy 1898–1904
- 3 Obstacles, Success, and Risks: The German Navy, 1905–1907
- 4 Meeting the German Challenge: The Royal Navy 1905–1907
- 5 Tirpitz Triumphant? German Naval Policy 1908–1911
- 6 Surpassing the German Challenge: The Royal Navy 1908–1911
- 7 Decay: German Naval Policy 1912–1914
- 8 Defeating the German Challenge: The Royal Navy 1912–1914
- Sources and Documents
- Index
- Miscellaneous Endmatter
7 - Decay: German Naval Policy 1912–1914
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 March 2024
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Notes on German Sources
- Introduction
- 1 Tirpitz's Ascendency: The Design and Initial Execution of a Naval Challenge 1895–1904/5
- 2 Recognising the German Challenge: The Royal Navy 1898–1904
- 3 Obstacles, Success, and Risks: The German Navy, 1905–1907
- 4 Meeting the German Challenge: The Royal Navy 1905–1907
- 5 Tirpitz Triumphant? German Naval Policy 1908–1911
- 6 Surpassing the German Challenge: The Royal Navy 1908–1911
- 7 Decay: German Naval Policy 1912–1914
- 8 Defeating the German Challenge: The Royal Navy 1912–1914
- Sources and Documents
- Index
- Miscellaneous Endmatter
Summary
In June 1912, Tirpitz had appeared triumphant again, as so often before in his struggle to build up a powerful navy. This time though, his triumph was rather fragile. The ink of the law had not even dried, when Capelle, Tirpitz's most loyal collaborator, warned that the financial constraints of this Navy Law would make further requests for naval increases impossible. In short, any technical innovation regarding either speed or gun-calibres would be difficult to follow for lack of money.
Tirpitz was well aware of these difficulties and until the outbreak of war, he continued to be haunted by the fear that his life's work might prove a failure in spite of the success he had just achieved. Disappointments, setbacks and frustrations soon further contributed to this state of mind. More often than before, Tirpitz, who had been in office since 1897, who had celebrated his sixtieth birthday in 1909, and who had been promoted to the rank of Grand Admiral in 1911, felt isolated, misunderstood, and sometimes even lonely.
Many minor or major incidents, contributed to his increasing uneasiness and his rising mistrust towards almost everybody, including the Emperor. For example, though Admiral von Holtzendorff, Commander-in-Chief of the High Seas Fleet, and one of his most important opponents within the navy, had had to retire in 1913, relations between Tirpitz and the ‘frontline’ did not improve. The ‘front’ continued to complain about Tirpitz's neglect of its more immediate needs – such as more personnel, higher pay, and both more time and more money for better training – instead of more ships which were increasingly difficult to man. Tirpitz, in turn, was soon convinced that neither Admiral Friedrich von Ingenohl, Holtzendorff's successor, nor Admiral Hugo von Pohl, who had succeeded Admiral August von Heeringen as Chief of the Admiralty Staff, were capable of fulfilling the tasks they had taken over. Moreover, the events surrounding the introduction of the Novelle in 1912 had made it clear to him that he could not rely upon Admiral von Müller, the influential Chief of the Navy Cabinet. In Tirpitz's eyes, Müller had tried to pave the way for a compromise between himself and the Chancellor instead ofgiving Tirpitz his full backing.
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- The Naval Route to the AbyssThe Anglo German Naval Race 1895-1914, pp. 397 - 414Publisher: Boydell & BrewerPrint publication year: 2015