The sweeping condemnation passed by Jomini on Napoleon's conduct in granting to the Allies the armistice of 4th June–10th August, 1813, is open to question; for the Emperor's positions near Breslau were menaced by Austria, whose partiality for the Allies was already observable. Further, he needed not only to reform his cavalry but also to construct an intrenched camp which would secure his communications with France. This had to be at Dresden, which was at that time weakly defended. He also wished to assure his hold on Hamburg. His neglect to appease Austria during the armistice resulted from resentment, from contempt of her resources, and from confidence in the defensive capacity of the line of the Elbe. He decided against withdrawal to the River Saal. Dangers of the Elbe line and measures taken for the strengthening of Dresden. A blow by the Allies at his communications would be met by a dash from the Zittau pass against Prague. As usual, Napoleon underestimated the enemies' strength.

The weakness of Dresden at the beginning of the autumn campaign led him on 12th August to plan a strict defensive within easy reach of that city, but on 13th August he developed his plans so as to include a pursuit of Blücher's Silesian army and an eventual move into Bohemia. Mean-while Oudinot was to drive Bernadotte's northern army from Berlin, Davout assisting from Hamburg by a blow at its communications.