The Central Claims of Natural Law Jurisprudence and Natural Law Political Philosophy

The central claim of natural law jurisprudence is that there is a positive internal connection between law and decisive reasons for action: law is backed by decisive reasons for action. (For there to be a decisive reason to ϕ is for ϕ-ing to be a reasonable act for one to perform and not ϕ-ing an unreasonable act for one to perform, and so for a law to be backed by decisive reasons is for there to be decisive reasons to perform any act required by that law.) The central claim of natural law political philosophy is that law has this reason-giving force through the common good of the political community. Natural law jurisprudence most fundamentally asserts that it is of the essence of law to bind in reason; natural law political philosophy most fundamentally asserts that what makes law bind is its role with respect to the common good of the political community.

Why should we take the view that these are the central theses of natural law jurisprudence and political philosophy to be anything more than stipulation? As the term ‘natural law theory’ is now used, Aquinas is the paradigmatic natural law theorist. If one would like evidence for Aquinas's status as the paradigm, one can look at any anthology of moral, political, or legal philosophy that includes a section on natural law theory: any such anthology contains a selection from Aquinas or about Aquinas.