Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- List of boxes
- List of contributors
- Foreword by James A. Baker, III
- Acknowledgments
- List of acronyms and abbreviations
- Part I Introduction and context
- Part II Historical case studies
- Part III International gas trade economics
- 11 The Baker Institute World Gas Trade Model
- 12 Political and economic influences on the future world market for natural gas
- 13 Market structure in the new gas economy: is cartelization possible?
- Part IV Implications
- Appendix: Technical notes
- Index
- References
12 - Political and economic influences on the future world market for natural gas
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 September 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- List of boxes
- List of contributors
- Foreword by James A. Baker, III
- Acknowledgments
- List of acronyms and abbreviations
- Part I Introduction and context
- Part II Historical case studies
- Part III International gas trade economics
- 11 The Baker Institute World Gas Trade Model
- 12 Political and economic influences on the future world market for natural gas
- 13 Market structure in the new gas economy: is cartelization possible?
- Part IV Implications
- Appendix: Technical notes
- Index
- References
Summary
Introduction
The base case model, discussed in chapter 11, assumed uniform rates of return across countries but allowed for different rates of return on different categories of investment. Specifically, we assumed that pipeline investments were least risky, followed by LNG regasification and liquefaction terminals, and then by mining projects (or exploration and development). The risk associated with pipeline investment is low as regulation often keeps the costs associated with transporting gas via pipeline quite stable. By contrast, since LNG liquefaction and regasification terminals embody less mature technologies, their costs of construction are likely to be more variable. Some of the risks associated with LNG, however, may be ameliorated by “bankable” contracts for LNG sales that limit variability in returns. The resource-mining projects are most risky because there is substantial geological uncertainty (such as initial reserve assessment, ultimate recoverability, and so forth), as well as economic uncertainty resulting from variation in commodity prices.
Assuming that rates of return on a given category of investment are uniform across countries ignores political factors that can greatly affect the risks of investing in different countries. These differing risks are a major reason that resources in some countries remain undeveloped. The relatively small amount of capital currently invested in such countries should make the return to capital relatively large and attract new investments, but the political risks may more than offset the higher expected return.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Natural Gas and GeopoliticsFrom 1970 to 2040, pp. 407 - 438Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2006
References
- 7
- Cited by