Recent developments in Burma/Myanmar underline the failure and counter-productivity of the “democracy paradigm” that has guided Western policy on the country since 1988, a paradigm that was based on misleading models from South Africa and Eastern Europe. The removal in late 2004 of Prime Minister Khin Nyunt and ministers loyal to him, together with a sweeping purge of military intelligence and related agencies, has significantly weakened the capacity of the military to manage the state and seen the government withdraw further into its shell. A resumption of armed conflict, rising crime rates, and a further fragmentation of the state, although perhaps not imminent, cannot be ruled out. These developments strongly suggest that there is a need to refocus current international efforts to effect change in Burma/Myanmar by working towards a more gradual and stable transition that maintains, and indeed strengthens, the capacity of the state and society to deal with the country's broader development needs.

The Fallacies of Current Western Policy Thinking

The core strategy of Western countries, which involves the use of censure and sanctions to isolate the military regime and force it to transfer power to a civilian, elected government, was developed in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when Burma/Myanmar seemed to many outside observers to have moved into a “democratic transition zone”. This strategy, however, is based on a number of fallacies or misleading notions about the situation both inside and outside the country that have become increasingly exposed over time.

The Military Perspective

The policies of the military regime, contrary to frequent claims by prodemocracy groups, are not based on pure opportunism. Many of the military leaders genuinely believe that the armed forces are the only institution that can keep the centrifugal forces in check and that democratic government would be bad for the country. When adding the obvious corporate and personal interests that they have in maintaining power, this mindset leaves very little room for negotiating political reform — at least, not in any form that might undermine the military's ultimate control of the government.