Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- List of Abbreviations
- 1 The Puzzle of Opposition Coordination
- 2 A Theory of Pecuniary Coalition Formation
- 3 The Emergence of Financial Reprisal Regimes
- 4 The Political Control of Banking
- 5 The Liberalization of Capital
- 6 The Political Alignment of Business
- 7 Opposition Bargaining across Ethnic Cleavages
- 8 Multiethnic Opposition Coalitions in African Elections
- 9 Democratic Consolidation in Africa
- Appendix A Commercial Banking Sector Size and Multiethnic Opposition Coalitions in Africa
- Appendix B Sources on Commodity Exports and Ethnic Production by Country
- Appendix C Variables: Definitions, Sources, and Summary Statistics
- Appendix D Multiethnic Opposition Coalitions in Africa, 1990–2005
- References
- Index
6 - The Political Alignment of Business
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 November 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- List of Abbreviations
- 1 The Puzzle of Opposition Coordination
- 2 A Theory of Pecuniary Coalition Formation
- 3 The Emergence of Financial Reprisal Regimes
- 4 The Political Control of Banking
- 5 The Liberalization of Capital
- 6 The Political Alignment of Business
- 7 Opposition Bargaining across Ethnic Cleavages
- 8 Multiethnic Opposition Coalitions in African Elections
- 9 Democratic Consolidation in Africa
- Appendix A Commercial Banking Sector Size and Multiethnic Opposition Coalitions in Africa
- Appendix B Sources on Commodity Exports and Ethnic Production by Country
- Appendix C Variables: Definitions, Sources, and Summary Statistics
- Appendix D Multiethnic Opposition Coalitions in Africa, 1990–2005
- References
- Index
Summary
The second decade of independence will see measures to intensify the class struggle and suppress the bourgeoisie….
Ahmed Sékou Touré, president of Guinea, 1968This chapter explains how the political alignment of business in Africa has continued to be shaped by the state’s influence over capital despite the adoption of democratic constitutions in the 1990s. The onset of multiparty competition, if anything, has underscored the political import of the private resources in the hands of entrepreneurs. If the resources of business could be brought to bear on the electoral process, opposition parties would be more likely to mount a viable challenge against incumbents who are able to fund their own reelection campaigns through the state’s coffers.
The evidence presented in the following pages shows how African leaders have prevented entrepreneurs from deploying their private resources toward political ends. Incumbents in most countries can leverage the state’s financial instruments and regulations to induce the acquiescence, if not active support, of business. Entrepreneurs are often obliged to publicly endorse the incumbent in an election or risk losing access to financial capital. But, in the African countries where liberalizing reforms have been undertaken, entrepreneurs are able to bypass the state in securing credit through multinational banks or locally owned private banks. No longer required to resort to political connections, these entrepreneurs are free to follow their partisan preferences, diversifying their political donations without fear of reprisals from the ruling party. It is under such conditions that business provides the opposition with the resources needed to become a viable alternative to the incumbent.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Multi-Ethnic Coalitions in AfricaBusiness Financing of Opposition Election Campaigns, pp. 138 - 177Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2012