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3 - Moral Luck

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2013

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Summary

Kant believed that good or bad luck should influence neither our moral judgment of a person and his actions, nor his moral assessment of himself.

The good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes or because of its adequacy to achieve some proposed end; it is good only because of its willing, i.e., it is good of itself. And, regarded for itself, it is to be esteemed incomparably higher than anything which could be brought about by it in favor of any inclination or even of the sum total of all inclinations. Even if it should happen that, by a particularly unfortunate fate or by the niggardly provision of a stepmotherly nature, this will should be wholly lacking in power to accomplish its purpose, and if even the greatest effort should not avail it to achieve anything of its end, and if there remained only the good will (not as a mere wish but as the summoning of all the means in our power), it would sparkle like a jewel in its own right, as something that had its full worth in itself. Usefulness or fruitlessness can neither diminish nor augment this worth.

He would presumably have said the same about a bad will: whether it accomplishes its evil purposes is morally irrelevant. And a course of action that would be condemned if it had a bad outcome cannot be vindicated if by luck it turns out well.

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Mortal Questions , pp. 24 - 38
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2012

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  • Moral Luck
  • Thomas Nagel
  • Book: Mortal Questions
  • Online publication: 05 August 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107341050.005
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  • Moral Luck
  • Thomas Nagel
  • Book: Mortal Questions
  • Online publication: 05 August 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107341050.005
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Moral Luck
  • Thomas Nagel
  • Book: Mortal Questions
  • Online publication: 05 August 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107341050.005
Available formats
×