Counterforce strategy does not provide a satisfactory form of nuclear deterrence. Not only is it doubtful that it could solve the credibility problem, but even if it could, it would at the same time weaken nuclear deterrence in the respect in which it is superior to conventional deterrence, and so have little or no net deterrent value in comparison with other forms of nuclear deterrence. As a result, counterforce strategy cannot serve as a basis for a successful rebuttal to the prima facie argument. The superiority of nuclear deterrence over conventional deterrence lies in the reassurance against attack provided to the opponent and the crystal ball effect, both of which are a function of the belief each side has in the fact of mutual vulnerability. This chapter considers countervalue strategy, the approach to deterrence that fully acknowledges the novel implications of mutual vulnerability.

Countervalue strategy, unlike counterforce strategy, embraces the condition of mutual vulnerability or mutual assured destruction. The argument is that mutual vulnerability is the basis for such a strong form of deterrence that the failure of nuclear deterrence to solve the credibility problem is not a bar to its being highly effective. This is the other rebuttal to the prima facie argument that nuclear deterrence is not prudentially preferable to conventional deterrence. Because the rebuttal offered by the counterforce strategists fails, the success of prudential revisionism depends on the failure of the rebuttal offered by countervalue strategists, or madvocates, as they are called.