Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Notes on Contributors
- Rationality and Goodness
- Acting Well
- Apprehending Human Form
- Does Modern Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
- Absolutes and Particulars
- On the so-called Logic of Practical Inference
- Absolute Prohibitions without Divine Promises
- Moral Obligation
- The Lesser Evil
- The Ethics of Co-operation in Wrongdoing
- Authority
- The Force of Numbers
- Reason, Intention, and Choice An essay in Practical Philosophy
- Modern Moral Philosophy and the Problem of Relevant Descriptions
- Index
Preface
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 May 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Notes on Contributors
- Rationality and Goodness
- Acting Well
- Apprehending Human Form
- Does Modern Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
- Absolutes and Particulars
- On the so-called Logic of Practical Inference
- Absolute Prohibitions without Divine Promises
- Moral Obligation
- The Lesser Evil
- The Ethics of Co-operation in Wrongdoing
- Authority
- The Force of Numbers
- Reason, Intention, and Choice An essay in Practical Philosophy
- Modern Moral Philosophy and the Problem of Relevant Descriptions
- Index
Summary
The papers contained in this volume are based on the Royal Institute of Philosophy's annual lecture series for 2002–3. Many readers will be aware that the title of the series refers to a famous paper by Elizabeth Anscombe with the same title, which was itself published, appropriately enough, in the Royal Institute's own journal Philosophy in 1958. While this collection is not a commentary either on ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ or on Anscombe's work more generally, it is a testament to the influence and potency of that article. Many of our contributors acknowledge its influence on them, and several take up the challenges Anscombe threw down in her original piece. In some quarters and in some ways moral philosophy was changed by Anscombe's article and, in the opinion of many, for the better. The collection as a whole reflects this state of affairs.
It is a pleasure to acknowledge the contributions of all those who gave lectures in the series, and who, collectively and unintentionally, have produced a remarkable, coherent volume. On behalf of the Royal Institute, I thank them all. But I am sure that no one would think it invidious if I were to single out one contribution in particular, that, namely, of Philippa Foot. Mrs Foot has herself been a towering presence in moral philosophy over several decades, and, as she herself acknowledges, particularly in the early days, was greatly influenced by Anscombe.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Modern Moral PhilosophyRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement: 54, pp. v - viPublisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2004