Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster have identified the historical legacy of the armed forces, especially their relationship with the previous regime, as one of the main factors determining the quality of post-authoritarian civil-military relations. This legacy is particularly relevant for states in which controversial debates about the military's past continue throughout the transition. Patricio Silva (2001, pp. 1–2), writing on South America, asserted that

Similar tensions exist in contemporary Indonesia. There are five aspects of TNI's historical legacy that possess analytical significance for the study of post-Suharto civil-military relations. First, the military's perception of itself as a “people's army” that — in contrast to civilian nationalist leaders — made no compromises in their fight against Dutch colonial forces and led the country to independence in 1945. Still popular in today's officer corps, this belief has supported both a sense of entitlement to participate in government and an engrained disdain for civilian politicians. Second, there is a widespread view in the Indonesian military that democratic civilian rule in the 1950s failed to establish good government and produced regional revolts that threatened to bring about the disintegration of the nation. The third legacy relates to the gradual evolution since the 1950s of a doctrine to justify military involvement in government, followed by the creation of an organizational format to support such an involvement. This doctrine — later known as Dual Function (Dwi Fungsi) — and the accompanying territorial command structure provided the foundation for the New Order regime after 1966. Fourth, the deep penetration by the military into civilian institutions under the New Order between 1966 and 1998 entrenched the armed forces in the infrastructure of the state.