The end of the Cultural Revolution is usually regarded as the beginning of the pragmatic phase in China's foreign policy and its ‘return’ to the family of nations. This process allegedly started in the summer of 1968 when the Chinese began to view the Soviet Union as their principal enemy, and culminated in Peking's admission to the United Nations, and the Sino-American thaw. Yet, if we examine these developments in light of China's Middle Eastern policy, two different processes are revealed. In the first, which started in late 1968 and early 1969, the foundation was laid for a more pragmatic foreign policy, but its implementation was frustrated, apparently by Lin Piao and the radicals. Therefore, although diplomatic relations were restored, preference was still given to revolutionary organisations rather than governments and the Sino-American rapprochement was delayed until the summer of 1971, when Lin Piao disappeared. It was only from that time and early 1972 that China's foreign policy indeed became pragmatic, under the influence of Mao, Chou En-lai, Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Hua Kuo-feng.

In both periods the struggle against the Soviets was central but, whereas in the first they were depicted mainly as an immediate threat to China itself, in the second they were attacked as the main threat to the world, primarily to Europe and the Middle East and more recently to Africa.