Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Maps
- Preface
- Glossary of Abbreviations
- Part I The Mediterranean Fleet from 1930 to the Ethiopian Crisis
- Part II The Abyssinian Crisis, 1935–1936
- Part III The Spanish Civil War and the Nyon Agreements, 1936–1937
- Part IV The Approach of War, 1938–1939
- Sources and Documents
- Index
- Miscellaneous Endmatter
Part IV - The Approach of War, 1938–1939
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 March 2024
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Maps
- Preface
- Glossary of Abbreviations
- Part I The Mediterranean Fleet from 1930 to the Ethiopian Crisis
- Part II The Abyssinian Crisis, 1935–1936
- Part III The Spanish Civil War and the Nyon Agreements, 1936–1937
- Part IV The Approach of War, 1938–1939
- Sources and Documents
- Index
- Miscellaneous Endmatter
Summary
The Spanish Civil War dragged on throughout 1938 and for much of the year it seemed as if neither side had the strength to bring it to a successful conclusion. This meant that the Mediterranean Fleet was obliged to continue the onerous duty of detaching cruisers and destroyers to the eastern coast of Spain to protect British shipping. The rotation of destroyer flotillas was particularly disliked because it interfered with training and flotilla work with the remainder of the fleet. At the beginning of the year it seemed as if there would be some relief. The Nyon agreements were apparently working, attacks by unknown ‘pirate’ submarines on shipping in the Mediterranean apparently ceased. This was not surprising since the perpetrator of those attacks, the Italians, had become part of the agreement. The British in early January were able to secure French and Italian agreement to a reduction in the patrols with the proviso that a small force was ready in each area to resume them if necessary [256–8]. The period of relief was short, for by mid January there were reports of attacks on British and other ships by submarines working outside of territorial waters. The Spanish Nationalists had only a pair of submarines obtained from Italy, but the Admiralty suspected the Italians might have been behind the attacks as they knew the Nyon patrols had been reduced [259]. Acting on Admiralty orders, Vice Admiral Cunningham, at the moment senior naval officer in the western basin of the Mediterranean, delivered a stiff protest to Admiral Moreno, the Nationalist naval commander at Palma. Cunningham sarcastically summed up Moreno's eventual reply after investigation: ‘The ships which were not sunk were attacked by Insurgent submarines whose Commanding Officers disobeyed their orders, whereas those which were sunk were not attacked by them’ [260]. The formal protest by the British Government to both sides in the war contained a threat to attack any submerged submarine encountered in the British zone [261, 262]. The protests and threats had their effect, Admiral Moreno agreed to restrict activities of the Nationalist submarines and Lieutenant Commander Hillgarth, the industrious consul in Palma was confident similar incidents would cease except, perhaps, for British merchant ships risking damage from air attack in Republican ports [264]. Attacks by aircraft on merchant ships, particularly Italian-manned aircraft according to Moreno, were likely to remain a problem.
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- The Mediterranean Fleet, 1930-1939 , pp. 379 - 558Publisher: Boydell & BrewerFirst published in: 2024