Rebellion is often portrayed as a breakdown of social relations and/or the rejection of a government or state system. There is certainly truth to this, but in the early Islamicate world as elsewhere in the premodern period, rebellion was not solely regarded as a violation of the social order: it was also an instrument in the repertoire of power politics, one of several ways in which to express grievances and a means to upholding justice. Rebellion could thus also serve to build up social relations by establishing or re-confirming relationships of interdependence. The classical Islamic law of rebellion (aḥkām al-bughāt), which developed over the course of the ninth to eleventh centuries, treats rebels with surprising leniency: categorized separately from apostates and bandits, who were classified as criminals, a complex legal framework regulated government responses to rebellion (baghy) and largely safeguarded rebel lives, property, and families, at least in theory. The aim, it appears, “was to rehabilitate rebels back into the body politic as quickly and completely as possible.” Various mechanisms could be employed to (re-)integrate malcontents into the socio-political fabric of the early Islamic state. These ranged from reciprocal peace treaties to intercession to the total obliteration of one party to the conflict—although the latter was unlikely, especially when individuals of high social standing were involved. What worked, and what did not, in each case depended on specific circumstance, offering insight into the navigation and negotiation of power dynamics in early Islamicate society.

This article looks at several examples of one specific approach to the reconciliation of rebels in the Umayyad and early ʿAbbāsid period: entreaties addressed to rebels, that is, peace proposals sent by the caliph or his representatives in the form of letters. The role reversals emanating from a context of rebellion may initially seem surprising: whereas it is usually the caliph who is approached by petitioners, here it is the ruler who takes up this position—if only implicitly—to entice the rebels to return to the fold. However, such attempts fully conformed with Islamic religio-political and legal thought on how to deal with rebellion. Legal scholars emphasized the ruler's obligation to attempt a peaceful resolution first by summoning a rebel faction to obedience or otherwise negotiating with them, which included offers of a safe-conduct (amān).