INTRODUCTION

The capabilities approach is characterized by a crucial ambiguity. If the point is that a just distribution of goods must be sensitive to differences in individuals' needs, the debate between a “primary goods” approach and a “capabilities” approach seems overblown. John Rawls prescribes adjustments in the distribution of primary goods for special needs, such as medical problems or learning disabilities (Rawls 1999b, pp. 174–76; 2001, pp. 172–76). In that respect, he is sensitive to capabilities. Furthermore, both a capabilities approach and a primary goods approach can recognize limits to our obligations to respond to special needs.

If the point of the capabilities approach is that just institutions must provide each citizen equally with certain capabilities and maintain them over time, there may be interesting differences with a primary goods approach. That said, I will argue that these differences do not favor the capabilities approach.

PRIMARY GOODS VERSUS FUNCTIONINGS

There are several advantages to focusing the claims of distributive justice on primary goods – basic rights, liberties, opportunities, and resources – rather than the welfare or “functionings” that individuals achieve by utilizing these goods. First of all, we may avoid the intractable problem of how to compare welfare levels interpersonally. Some egalitarians argue that persons are entitled to enjoy equal levels of welfare and should not be disadvantaged by factors, such as a tendency to depression or even a proclivity for expensive tastes, for which they are not to blame.