Chapter Thirteen - “The Colour Flows Back”: Intention and Interpretation in Literature and Everyday Action
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 December 2022
Summary
Frank Cioffi argues persuasively that our relation to works of literature is such that information about what the author knows, intends, means, and so forth, tends to influence our response to that author's work. Indeed, this feature of the “physiognomy of literature” makes it difficult to sustain the distinction between what Cioffi calls “biographical” information about the author and critical comment about the text:
A reader's response to a work will vary with what he knows; one of the things which he knows and with which his responses will vary is what the author had in mind, or what he intended. The distinction between what different people know of an author before reading his work and what the same person knows on successive occasions can't be a logical one. When is a remark a critical remark about the poem and when a biographical one about the author? The difficulty in obeying the injunction to ignore the biographical facts and cultivate the critical ones is that you can't know which is which until after you have read the work in the light of them.
Writing is an especially complex human activity. A work of literature, like everyday action, is at least partly interpreted, given meaning, or made sense of by holding it up to and examining it through the familiar light of reason-explanation—a form of explanation that trades in details about what the agent intends and wants, what she knows or could not have known. The difficulty Cioffi finds in distinguishing between biographical evidence and textual evidence when it comes to interpreting and evaluating literature applies more generally to the understanding and interpretation of everyday action. Just as our description of what an author has in mind may influence our understanding of what she writes, so, too, may our understanding of what an agent has in mind influence our understanding of her actions and activities, broadly construed. Indeed, it may be denied in the general case that the distinction is a logical one—denied in other words, that what an agent has in mind and what she does are logically distinct phenomena— since our acceptance that an agent had something in mind may not merely force a different understanding of a performance already defined: it may also force a different way of describing it.
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- Meaning, Mind, and ActionPhilosophical Essays, pp. 195 - 212Publisher: Anthem PressPrint publication year: 2022