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Chapter 7 - Performative Struggles and Theory–Practice Decoupling in the Design and the Implementation of a Market-Based Instrument: French Tradable Certificates for Energy Efficiency

from Part II - Post-Performative Approaches to Studying Markets

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 November 2024

By
Thomas Reverdy
Edited by
Susi Geiger ,
Katy Mason ,
Neil Pollock ,
Philip Roscoe ,
Annmarie Ryan ,
Stefan Schwarzkopf  and
Pascale Trompette
Susi Geiger
Affiliation:
University College Dublin
Katy Mason
Affiliation:
Lancaster University
Neil Pollock
Affiliation:
University of Edinburgh
Philip Roscoe
Affiliation:
University of St Andrews, Scotland
Annmarie Ryan
Affiliation:
University of Limerick
Stefan Schwarzkopf
Affiliation:
Copenhagen Business School
Pascale Trompette
Affiliation:
Université de Grenoble
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Summary

The design and implementation of the French energy efficiency certificate provides an opportunity to test the hypothesis of the performativity of the economic theory associated with the cap-and-trade market-based instrument. The empirical study of its design and implementation, through interviews and regulatory analysis, reveals a progressive dynamic of decoupling from its initial principles, in particular the equivalence between the quantity of energy saved and the allocation of certificates. Recent adaptations of the instrument attempt to integrate an alternative definition of efficiency based on cost estimation and subsidy allocation. By focusing on calculation practices, this chapter contributes to the understanding of performative struggles and theory-practice decoupling associated with market-based instruments. The chapter identifies four conditions for theory-practice decoupling: competing theories of efficiency, attachment to the instrument, a new principle of action, and weak checks on conformity to theory.

Keywords

Performativityperformative strugglesenergy marketsdecoupling
Type
Chapter
Information
Market Studies
Mapping, Theorizing and Impacting Market Action
 , pp. 114 - 126
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024

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