Book contents
- The Malayan Emergency
- Cambridge Military Histories
- The Malayan Emergency
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Maps
- Tables and Charts
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- Note On the Text: Language, Terminology and Measures
- Abbreviations
- Additional material
- 1 Introduction and Overview
- 2 Fatal Decisions
- 3 Terror, Counter-Terror and Pressure
- 4 Bureaucratic Counter-Terror and MNLA Main Forces
- 5 The Briggs Plan
- 6 Chin Peng and Communist Plans
- 7 Templer
- 8 Optimising Counterinsurgency
- 9 Politics, Decolonisation and Counterinsurgency
- 10 Conclusion
- Appendix 1 Emergency Statistics, 1948 to 1960
- Appendix 2 The Second Emergency, 1968 to 1989
- Glossary
- Bibliography
- Index
3 - Terror, Counter-Terror and Pressure
June 1948 to January 1949
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 December 2021
- The Malayan Emergency
- Cambridge Military Histories
- The Malayan Emergency
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Maps
- Tables and Charts
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- Note On the Text: Language, Terminology and Measures
- Abbreviations
- Additional material
- 1 Introduction and Overview
- 2 Fatal Decisions
- 3 Terror, Counter-Terror and Pressure
- 4 Bureaucratic Counter-Terror and MNLA Main Forces
- 5 The Briggs Plan
- 6 Chin Peng and Communist Plans
- 7 Templer
- 8 Optimising Counterinsurgency
- 9 Politics, Decolonisation and Counterinsurgency
- 10 Conclusion
- Appendix 1 Emergency Statistics, 1948 to 1960
- Appendix 2 The Second Emergency, 1968 to 1989
- Glossary
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The first months of the Emergency saw chaos and uncertainty as both sides were caught off-guard and scrambled to organise. A combination of MCP policy of intermingling with rural villagers and British policy of exerting ‘pressure’ on the same villagers saw huts burned, people shot running and ‘excesses’ including twenty-four killed at Batang Kali. In effect, rural civilians were caught between MCP ‘terror’ (objectively, if not by intent) and British ‘counter-terror’ and pressure. Government, meanwhile, was gestating more positive measures, so that by the year’s end it was pushing states to start resettlement of villagers and was working with Chinese leaders in the MCA.
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- Information
- The Malayan EmergencyRevolution and Counterinsurgency at the End of Empire, pp. 79 - 138Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021