Book contents
- Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief
- Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 Rational Belief and Statistical Evidence
- Chapter 2 Knowledge Attributions and Lottery Cases
- Chapter 3 The Psychological Dimension of the Lottery Paradox
- Chapter 4 Three Puzzles about Lotteries
- Chapter 5 Four Arguments for Denying that Lottery Beliefs Are Justified
- Chapter 6 Rethinking the Lottery Paradox
- Chapter 7 Rational Belief in Lottery- and Preface-Situations
- Chapter 8 Stability and the Lottery Paradox
- Chapter 9 The Lottery, the Preface, and Epistemic Rule Consequentialism
- Chapter 10 Beliefs, Probabilities, and Their Coherent Correspondence
- Chapter 11 The Relation between Degrees of Belief and Binary Beliefs
- Bibliography
- Index
Chapter 6 - Rethinking the Lottery Paradox
A Dual Processing Perspective
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 January 2021
- Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief
- Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 Rational Belief and Statistical Evidence
- Chapter 2 Knowledge Attributions and Lottery Cases
- Chapter 3 The Psychological Dimension of the Lottery Paradox
- Chapter 4 Three Puzzles about Lotteries
- Chapter 5 Four Arguments for Denying that Lottery Beliefs Are Justified
- Chapter 6 Rethinking the Lottery Paradox
- Chapter 7 Rational Belief in Lottery- and Preface-Situations
- Chapter 8 Stability and the Lottery Paradox
- Chapter 9 The Lottery, the Preface, and Epistemic Rule Consequentialism
- Chapter 10 Beliefs, Probabilities, and Their Coherent Correspondence
- Chapter 11 The Relation between Degrees of Belief and Binary Beliefs
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
It has become standard practice in philosophy to follow Richard Foley (1992) in distinguishing between an epistemology of belief and an epistemology of degrees of belief. The former distinguishes among three doxastic attitudes: belief, disbelief (i.e., believing something not to be the case), and suspension of belief. Key to the latter epistemology is the idea that beliefs come in various strengths, where the strength of a belief can be measured on a continuous scale (typically, the unit interval but that is a matter of convention). Many have hoped that because the two epistemologies appear to differ only in assuming a different granularity while looking at the same attitude – that of belief – there must be some way to connect them. Finding one or more bridge principles between these epistemologies seems a worthy endeavor indeed, for given such principles, we might be able to derive truths about the notion of categorical belief from insights about the notion of graded belief, or vice versa.
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- Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational BeliefEssays on the Lottery Paradox, pp. 110 - 127Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021
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