Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Foreword
- Contents
- List of Diagrams
- List of Acronyms
- Map of Sierra Leone
- Acknowledgements
- Chapter 1 Introduction: the Research Journey
- PART I RECONCILIATION AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICT: CHARTING THE TERRAIN
- PART II THE STORY
- PART III FINDINGS
- PART IV CONCLUSION
- Epilogue
- Appendix: Chronology Of Events
- Bibliography
Chapter 6 - The ‘Rebel’ War
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 December 2020
- Frontmatter
- Foreword
- Contents
- List of Diagrams
- List of Acronyms
- Map of Sierra Leone
- Acknowledgements
- Chapter 1 Introduction: the Research Journey
- PART I RECONCILIATION AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICT: CHARTING THE TERRAIN
- PART II THE STORY
- PART III FINDINGS
- PART IV CONCLUSION
- Epilogue
- Appendix: Chronology Of Events
- Bibliography
Summary
The war in Sierra Leone is usually portrayed as a ‘rebel’ war and a war of soldiers gone bad. We are reminded of horrific crimes, of rapes, amputations, torture and murder and of the children, drugged and traumatized, who were forced to do these things. This simplistic portrayal does not begin to capture the war dynamics, which are integral to promoting reconciliation. Reconciliation cannot occur when entire segments of actors are dismissed in the dehumanizing term, ‘lumpen.’ The TRC report (2004) provides important insights into people's motivations and strategies and the power struggles and untenable situations that people found themselves in
THE RUF INSURGENCY
The date of March 23, 1991 is usually given for the beginning of the incursion but cross-border NPFL engagements with the Sierra Leone army began in 1990. This porous border had long been crossed for trade between Liberians and Sierra Leoneans who had more connection with Liberia than with Freetown. As the Liberian war worsened, refugees and armed supporters of President Samuel Doe crossed into Sierra Leone seeking refuge or the opportunity to regroup. Soon Taylor's NPFL forces followed them, sometimes looting and harassing locals before returning to Liberia (TRC, 2004).
After complaints by villagers of Bomaru, Kailahun District, the Sierra Leone government sent a platoon of about 30 soldiers to the area. However, soldiers began to befriend and trade with the very rebels they were sent to deter, exchanging cigarettes and food for looted Liberian goods. The March 23 raid at Bomaru by 40 to 60 NPFL troops may have been the result of a deal that went bad with these soldiers (TRC, 2004). However, the TRC (2004) writes, the attack:
…served an important strategic purpose for the would-be insurgents. It demonstrated that the border crossing was effectively unprotected and that troops stationed in the territory just beyond could easily be caught off-guard. It convinced the commandos involved that they could quickly repeat the tactic and conduct further attacks in a similar vein, probing deeper and staying longer. On the whole, if Sankoh had at all been wavering as to his attacking strategy, the attack was a fillip to his confidence (vol. 3a, chap. 3, §104).
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- Long Road HomeBuilding Reconciliation and Trust in Post-War Sierra Leone, pp. 87 - 120Publisher: IntersentiaPrint publication year: 2010