Departures

In the preceding chapters, we presented a theory of bureaucracy that is logically self-contained and capable of predictions, and that, we believe, explains a good deal of bureaucratic conduct. Although it is also a fairly simple theory, it departs from accepted models and views of bureaucracy in a number of ways that we will mention as a way of summing up.

Our most important departure from conventional theories of bureaucracy is this: We do not model the relationship between superiors and subordinates as relations of authority, but instead as relations of exchange based on trust. In our view, bureaucracies should, at least in part, be conceived as sets of networks (surrogate markets) in which bureaucrats - superiors and subordinates at all levels - trade with each other. It is true that when inefficient services are supplied by subordinates, superiors acquire something they do not want. However, this does not mean that the relationship is not one of exchange, any more than having a transmission replaced in a car that needs a new gasket implies that one has left the world of market exchange.

One could say that our analysis of network trading - in which buyers sometimes get what they want but at other times get something quite different - is applicable to a wide range of transactions in the markets of everyday life, where one generally gets what one expects, but sometimes not. The difference is that network trading is mainly supported by trust, whereas market trading is mainly supported by contracts. But that difference should not be exaggerated, because trust also plays a role in many market transactions.